STIET Seminar to cover signaling games
John Kagel, professor of economics at Ohio State University, will be at SI this week to discuss “Learning in Signaling Games: Recent Experimental Results.” His visit is part of the STIET/Incentive-Centered Design Seminar series and will be from 4-5:30 p.m. Thursday, April 16 in 1202 SI North. The program will also be videocast to 313 State Hall at Wayne State University.
The speaker is University Chaired Professor of Economics and director of the Economic Laboratory at Ohio State University. He is best known for his applications of experimental methods to the study of economics. Early work involved study of individual choice behavior (consumer choice, labor supply, and choice under uncertainty) using both human and sub-human subjects. He has made major contributions to the study of mineral rights/common value auctions. Recent work involves exploring issues in industrial organization theory including signaling games, predatory pricing, and incentive contracts. He has also done work in learning and adjustment processes in economic games, and work on legislative bargaining.
He describes his talk:
“We report results from a series of experiments looking at learning in signaling games — a wide class of games ranging from Spence’s educational model to industrial organization applications such as in entry limit pricing. The focus of the research is on learning to play strategically as Individuals playing the game in the standard (for economics) generic context only learn to play strategically very slowly and at best exhibit weak or non-existent cross-game learning. In contrast, experiments with the same game in two person teams show much more rapid learning, meeting, and even beating, the demanding ‘truth wins’ norm for team play in more difficult games. We also show how the use of meaningful context can at times promote positive significant cross-game learning for individuals in some cases while retarding learning in other cases (while having no impact on team play in this case). Surprisingly, advice achieves much the same results as teams for both advisee and advisors, where the latter have only their own voices to listen to. We relate our results to the psychology literature on team play and cross-game learning.”
The research is joint work with David Cooper.
Explore posts in the same categories: Events, Faculty, ResearchTags: signaling games, stiet
You can comment below, or link to this permanent URL from your own site.
